

# Innovation Spillovers and Merger Decisions: Evidence from a Panel of U.S. Firms

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# Merger in Innovative Industries

## Mergers in Innovative Industries

Chirgui (2009); De Man and Dysters (2005)

- Mergers Provide Resources for Innovation  
Katz and Shelanski (2005); Becketti (1986)
- Combining R&D and Research Pipeline  
Huck et al. (2000); Henderson (2000)
- Innovation Spillovers  
(Entezarkheir and Moshiri (2017);  
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# Merger and Spillover

Spillover of Firms' Innovative Ideas  $\Rightarrow$

- Aghion and Howitt (1992, 1998); Jaffe (1998)
- Discourages Innovation
- Private Return  $\neq$  Social Returns

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# Outward Innovation Spillover

- Firms' Innovation Generates Knowledge  
Driffield et al. (2010); Driffield (2001); Oulton (1997)
- Firms Gain Competitive Advantage from Knowledge  
Alcacer and Chung (2007)
- Firms can not Easily Prevent Leakage of Knowledge

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# Inward Innovation Spillover

- Other's Innovation Increase Receiving Firms' Productivity  
Jaffe (1986); Alcacer and Zhao (2012)
- Other's Innovation Increase Their Efficiency  
Alcacer and Chung (2007)
- Other's Innovation Limit Receiving Firms' Market  
Alcacer and Chung (2007)

⇒ Receiving Firms' Merge to Regain Competitive Edge

# Our Contributions and Analysis

Panel of Merging and Non-Merging Firms

Empirical Evidence for the Impact of

- Outward Innovation Spillover on Merger
- Inward Innovation Spillover on Merger

Instrumented Impact of Outward Spillover on Merger

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# Our Contributions and Analysis

## Driving Factors of Merger Waves (Brealey et al., 2012)

- Business Cycles  
Komlenovic et al. (2011)
- Neoclassical Theory  
Harford (2005)
- Behavioural Theory  
Shleifer and Vishny (2003)
- Q Theory  
Jovanovic and Rousseau (2002)

# Our Contributions and Analysis

- Within Industry Inward Spillover
- Between Industry Inward Spillover

# Panel Logit Regression

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Prob}(\text{Merger}_{it}) = & \beta_0 + \beta_1 \log R\&D\text{Stock}_{it-1} + \beta_2 \log \text{Spill} R\&D_{it-1} \\ & + \beta_3 BC_{t-1} + \beta_4 \text{Asset Turnover}_{it} + \beta_5 \text{Employ Growth}_{it} \\ & + \beta_6 \text{Sale Growth}_{it} + \beta_7 \text{Profitability}_{it} + \beta_8 \text{ROA}_{it} \\ & + \beta_9 \text{Capital Exp}_{it} + \beta_{10} \text{Tobin's } q_{it} + \beta_{11} \text{HHI}_{jt} \\ & + \alpha_i + \epsilon_{it} \end{aligned}$$

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# Measuring Outward Spillover

Outward Spillover is Measured by

- Stock of R&D  
( $R\&DStock_{it}$ )  
Noel and Schankerman (2013); Hall et al. (2005)
- Stock of Citation-Weighted Patents  
( $CitationPatent_{it}$ )  
Entezarkheir and Moshiri (2017); Hall et al. (2005)

# Measuring Inward Spillover

Literature Suggests Two Methods:

- Aggregated R&D of Other Firms  
Bernstein and Nadiri (1989)
- Aggregated and Weighted R&D of Other Firms  
Weights are Technological Distance  
Entezarkheir (2017); Bloom et al. (2013);  
Noel and Schankerman (2013); Jaffe (1986)

# Measuring Inward Spillover

Inward Spillover is Measured by

- $SpillR\&D_{it} = \sum_{j \neq i} \rho_{ij} \times R\&DStock_{jt}$
- $SpillCitePat_{it} = \sum_{j \neq i} \rho_{ij} \times CitationPatent_{jt}$

$$Technological\ Proximity = \rho_{ij} = \frac{S_i' S_j}{(S_i' S_i)^{1/2} (S_j' S_j)^{1/2}}$$

$$S_i = s_{i1}, s_{i2}, \dots, s_{iN}$$

# Data Sources

## Updated NBER Patent and Citation Data

- From 1976 to 2006

## Compustat (Standard and Poors)

- From 1976 to 2006

## Company Identifier Data

## Thompson Financial SDC Platinum Merger Data

- 877 Merger Pairs from 1980 to 2003

## Bloomberg

# Sample

Unbalanced Panel of 6,030 Merging and Non-Merging  
Publicly Traded U.S. Manufacturing Firms from 1980 to 2003  
with 60,736 Observations and 877 Pairs of Merging Firms

# Panel Logit Regression

$$\begin{aligned}
 \text{Prob}(\text{Merger}_{it}) = & \beta_0 + \beta_1 \log R\&D\text{Stock}_{it-1} + \beta_2 \log \text{Spill}R\&D_{it-1} \\
 & + \beta_3 BC_{t-1} + \beta_4 \text{Asset Turnover}_{it} + \beta_5 \text{Employ Growth}_{it} \\
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 & + \alpha_i + \epsilon_{it}
 \end{aligned}$$

## Merger Decision and Innovation Spillover

DV	(1)	(2)(RE)	(3)	(4)
<i>Merger<sub>it</sub></i>				
<i>logR&amp;DStock<sub>it-1</sub></i>	0.380*** (0.088)	0.0.454*** (0.049)	0.402** (0.126)	
<i>logSpillR&amp;D<sub>it-1</sub></i>	0.661 *** (0.169)	0.320*** (0.082)		
<i>logSpillR&amp;DInd<sub>it-1</sub></i>			0.629** (0.228)	
<i>logCitePatent<sub>it-1</sub></i>				0.083** (0.034)
<i>logSpillCitePat<sub>it-1</sub></i>				0.761*** (0.125)
Firm FE	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Other Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

# Measuring Patent Thicket as Instrument

$$F_{it} = 1 - \sum_{j=0}^J \left( \frac{\text{cite}_{ijt}}{\text{cite}_{it}} \right)^2$$

i-Citing Firm

j-Cited Firm

t-Year

## Panel IV Estimates of Merger and Innovation Spillover

<b>First Stage IV</b>			
<b>Panel Fixed Effects Estimator</b>			
DV: $\log R\&D\text{Stock}_{it-1}$	(1)	(2)	(3)
F	19.62 [0.000]	157.19 [0.000]	144 [0.000]
$\log F_{it-1}$	-0.295*** (0.038)		-0.124*** (0.025)
$\log F_{it-2}$		-0.154*** (0.025)	-0.150*** (0.025)
<b>Second Stage IV</b>			
<b>Panel Logit Estimator</b>			
DV: $\text{Merger}_{it}$			
$\log R\&D\text{Stock}_{it-1}$	0.376*** (0.101)	0.358** (0.123)	0.357** (0.119)
Firm FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
J-test			2.09 [5.024]

# Measuring Intra Industry R&D Spillover

$$\text{intraSpillR\&D}_{izt} = \sum_{j=1, j \neq i}^{n_z} \rho_{ij} \times \text{R\&Dstock}_{jzt}$$

$\rho_{ij}$ : Technological Proximity

$z$ : Stands for 6 Industries

$n_z$ : Number of Firms in Industry  $z$  Except for Firm  $i$

# Measuring Inter Industry R&D Spillover

$$inerSpillR\&D_{izt} = \sum_{h=1, h \neq z}^6 \sum_{j=1, j \neq i}^{n_h} \rho_{ij} \times R\&Dstock_{jht}$$

$\rho_{ij}$ : Technological Proximity

$h$ : Other Industries Except for Industry of Firm  $i$

$n_h$ : Number of Firms in Other Industries

## Intra and Inter R&D Spillovers and Merger

DV	(1)	(2)	(3)
<i>Merger<sub>it</sub></i>	All	Horizontal Non-Merging	Non-Horizontal Non-Merging
<i>logR&amp;DStock<sub>it-1</sub></i>	0.349*** (0.105)	0.412*** (0.111)	0.296 (0.252)
<i>logintraSpillR&amp;D<sub>iz-1</sub></i>	0.608** (0.256)	0.552** (0.215)	
<i>loginterSpillR&amp;D<sub>iz-1</sub></i>	0.075 (0.302)		0.718 (0.510)
Firm FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Other Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes

# Conclusions

- Outward Spillover  $\uparrow$  Merger
- Instrumented Outward Spillover  $\uparrow$  Merger
- Inward Spillover  $\uparrow$  Merger
- Within Industry Inward Spillover  $\uparrow$  Merger
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# Future Research

- Mergers and R&D Advancements
- Mergers and Attainment of Intangible Assets